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FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

SECRET SENSITIVE VIA MARTIN CHANNELS WH50708

APRIL 26, 1975

TO: GRAHAM MARTIN
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

MY THINKING REGARDING THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SAIGON IS THAT FOLLOWING THE FORMATION OF A MINH GOVERNMENT, THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT MORE OR LESS RAPIDLY IN AN AGREEMENT ON A TRIPARTITE GOVERNMENT. THAT GOVERNMENT WILL BE TWO-THIRDS "COMMUNIST" AND ONE-THIRD CONTROLLED BY THEM. OUR PROBLEM AT THAT POINT WILL BE WHAT TO DO WITH THE EMBASSY.

AT SOME JUNCTURE, PERHAPS SOON, THE NORTH WILL DECIDE TO PREVENT THE FURTHER EVACUATION OF VIETNAMESE. WHEN THAT HAPPENS, I THINK WE SHOULD CUT DOWN TO VERY BARE-BONES OPERATION AT THE EMBASSY. THE QUESTION THEN WILL BE WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD PULL OUT ALL-TOGETHER OR MAINTAIN A TOKEN PRESENCE WITH A HANDFUL OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

THE CHOICE, AS I SEE IT, IS BETWEEN PULLING OUT AND PERHAPS SUBSEQUENTLY NEGOTIATING A REENTRY OR TRYING TO MAINTAIN A RESIDUAL PRESENCE, WITH THE ATTENDANT RISK OF BEING THROWN OUT, OR, CONVERSELY, PRESSURED TO BE AN AGENCY TO PROVIDE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

WHAT I WOULD LIKE IS YOUR MORE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAN YOU HAVE THUSFAR GIVEN ON THE PROBABLE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS AND HOW WE SHOULD REACT TO THEM. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE HAVING YOUR VIEWS BY OPENING OF BUSINESS HERE ON MONDAY.

WARM REGARDS.

0254

********** WHSR COMMENT **********

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED
PSN:020540 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:116/211202 DTG:262141Z APR 75

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By lit, NARA, Date 1/10/00

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VIA MARTIN CHANNEL

April 26, 1975

TO: GRAHAM MARTIN

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

My thinking regarding the political evolution in Saigon is that following the formation of a Minh government, there will be negotiations which will result more or less rapidly in an agreement on a tripartite government. That government will be two-thirds "Communist" and one-third controlled by them. Our problem at that point will be what to do with the Embassy.

At some ~~point~~ juncture, perhaps soon, the North will decide to prevent the further evacuation of Vietnamese. ~~At that point~~ When that happens, I think we should cut down to a very bare-bones operation at the Embassy. The question then will be whether or not we should pull out all-together or maintain a token presence ~~through~~ with a handful of Embassy personnel.

The choice, as I see it, is between pulling out and perhaps subsequently negotiating a re-entry or trying to maintain a residual presence, with the attendant risk of being thrown out, or, conversely, ~~used as~~ presumed to be an agency to provide relief and rehabilitation to the new government.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By Lit, NARA, Date 1/10/00

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What I would like is your more considered judgment than you have thusfar given on the probable evolution of events and how we should react to them. I would greatly appreciate having your views by opening of business here on Monday.

Warm regards.

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